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"What's in a Name?" An Essay on
Valid Existing Rights
By CAROLYN S. BRATT*
While I was reading the myriad statutes' and law review
articles2 involving the concept of "valid existing rights" or VERs,
William Shakespeare's famous question came to mind. "What's
in a name?" 3 During my initial, unsuccessful attempts to cate-
gorize, classify, and comprehend the numerous judicial and quasi-
judicial decisions construing the phrase "valid existing rights,"
the question came back. "What's in a name?" As I followed
the tortured history of the VER provision in the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act through a dozen or so unsuccessful
years of attempted rulemaking, 4 the question was still there.
"What's in a name?"
* W.L. Matthews Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. The
author gives special recongition to the research assistance of Gladys Beck Green, 3d year
law student, University of Kentucky College of Law.
I E.g., Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
87, Title V, § 522(e), 91 Stat. 507 (codified as 30 U.S.C. 1272(e) (1988)); Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579 § 701(h), 90 Stat. 2744
(codified as 43 U.S.C. § 1701 note (1982)); Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub.
L. No. 92-203 § 14(g), 85 Stat. 702 (1971) (codified as 43 U.S.C. 1613(g) (1982));
Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577 § 4(d)(3), 78 Stat. 893 (codified as 43
U.S.C. § 1613(g) (1982)); and, Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, Act of Feb. 25, 1920, c.
85, § 37, 41 Stat. 451 (codified as 30 U.S.C. § 193 (1988)).
2 E.g., Barkeley & Albert, A Survey of Case Law Interpreting "Valid Existing
Rights"- Implications for Unpatented Mining Claims, 34 ROCKY MT. MINERAL LAW
INST. 9-1 (1988); Laitos & Westfall, Government Interference with Private Interests in
Public Resources, II HARv. ENVT'L L. REv. 1 (1985); McFerrin & Whitman, Valid
Existing Rights and the Constitution: 1983 Regulatory Changes, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 647
(1985); and Regulation and Land Withdrawals: Defining "Valid Existing Rights," 3 J.
OF MIN. L. & POL'Y 517 (1988).
3 W. Shakespeare, "Romeo & Juliet," Act 11, Scene 11, 43.
1 The Office of Surface Mining and Reclamation Enforcement [OSM] published
its first definition of "valid existing rights" under the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act in 1979. 44 Fed.Reg. 15,342 (codified at 30 C.F.R. 761.5(a)(1)-(2)
(1979)). An applicant for a VER had to demonstrate that it (1) had a property right on
August 3, 1977, that would allow the production of coal by surface mining techniques
(ownership and authority requirement); and (2) had acquired all necessary state and
federal permits by August 3, 1977 (all permits requirement); or (3) had demonstrated
that the coal was needed for and adjacent to a surface mine for which all permits had
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That nagging question finally led me to an examination of
the outcomes of VER litigation. As I focused on the results of
VER litigation, not the rationales for those results, a striking
pattern emerged. The courts found a VER and immuned the
complainant from the commands of the particular statute only
when the Fifth Amendment5 would have been offended by ap-
been acquired by August 3, 1977 (adjacent to and necessary requirement). 30 C.F.R.
761.5(a)(1) - (2) (1979). These regulations were remanded to OSM in In Re: Permanent
Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 14 Env't Rep. Cas.(BNA) 1083, 1091 (D. D.C.
1980)(mem.) The district court instructed OSM to modify the "all permits" portion of
its regulation. The court suggested that "a good faith attempt to obtain all permits"
before August 3, 1977, should be incorporated into their definition. The Secretary of
the Interior suspended the part of the definition of VER which required the acquisition
of all permits and proposed to interpret VER as requiring a "good faith attempt to
obtain all permits." Id. Also see discussion 45 Fed.Reg. 51,547, 51,548 (1980) (notice
of suspension). In 1982, OSM proposed three different definitions for VER - 1) an "all
permits test" modified by the "good faith efforts" standard; 2) an "ownership" test;
or 3) an "ownership and authority" (right to mine by method chosen) test. 47 Fed.Reg.
25,278, 25,279-81 (1982). In its 1982 proposal analysis OSM cited H.R. REP. No. 218,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. ADMIN. NEWS 593, 631 as
indicating that the Committee intended that substantial legal and financial commitments
(to establish VER) did not mean the "mere ownership or acquisition costs of the coal
itself or the right to mine it. ... ." 47 Fed. Reg. 25,278, 25,280 (1982). Also, OSM
proposed to include the statement that a "VER may be found where no reasonable use
of the property other than surface mining would otherwise remain." Id. at 25,281
(proposing new paragraph (d) for each option). The final rule announced by OSM was
completely different from the three proposed alternatives. A VER was defined as:
[A] person possesses valid existing rights for an area protected under section
522(e) of The Act on August 3, 1977, if the application of any of the
prohibitions contained in that section to the property interest that existed
on that date would effect a taking of the person's property which would
entitle the person to just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution ....
48 Fed. Reg. 41,312, 41,349 (1983); 30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1984).
In In RE: Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig.(II), 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1557 (D. D.C. 1985) the district court remanded the rule on the procedural ground that
the new definition was "so different from the proposed options that a new notice and
comment period was necessary." Id. at 1559 (stating agreement with plaintiffs' position).
OSM suspended its "takings" test and reinstated the modified "all permits test." 51
Fed.Reg. 41,952 (1986). In 1988, OSM once again proposed rules for defining VER. 53
Fed.Reg. 52,374 (1988), see also 54 Fed.Reg. 989 (1989) (opening of comment period
on related draft supplemental environmental impact statement). One option was the
"ownership and authority" test and the other was the "modified all permits" test. OSM
withdrew those proposed rules. 54 Fed.Reg. 30,557 (1989). Thus, twelve years after
Congress adopted SMCRA, there is no regulatory definition of the meaning of "valid
existing rights" as used in the Act.
' U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides in part: "nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNST. amend XIV provides in part:
"nor shall any State deprive any person of . . .property, without due process of law."
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' protections against governmental "takings" of
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plication of the statute to the complainant's interest. The courts
did not recognize a VER and applied the statute to the com-
plainant's interest only in circumstances in which the Fifth
Amendment would not have been offended.
Suddenly, I had the answer to my recurring question, "What's
in a name?" Shakespeare was correct when he wrote, "That
which we call a rose by any other word would smell as sweet."
'6
In application, the legislatively created concept of "valid existing
rights" invariably leads to the same result as a federal consti-
tutional "taking" analysis of the same case. Stripped of all the
verbiage surrounding it, a VER, as applied by the courts, is
coterminus with, not in addition to, a property owner's protec-
tions under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution.
This essay defends the thesis that regardless of what Congress
actually intended, the courts apply the VER concept so as to
afford property owners no more (or less) protection than they
already had under the Fifth Amendment. The essay briefly de-
fines the parameters of the Fifth Amendment's taking prohibi-
tion. A taking analysis of some VER cases and VER definitions
is included in the essay as illustrative examples of the thesis.
Finally, the essay looks at the wisdom of treating VER provisions
in legislative enactments as synonymous with the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.
I. THE TAKING ANALYSIS
The Fifth Amendment's prohibition "nor shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation ' 7 im-
poses limitations on the government's ability to interfere with
private property rights. The operative words of the Amendment
are "property," "public use," "taken," and "just compensa-
tion." This essay focuses on only the meaning of the "property"
and "taken" language.
Although a valid public purpose is a necessary prerequisite
to the government's exercise of its taking power,8 VER litigation
private property absent the payment of just compensation are coextensive. Chicago B.
& Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Thus, this essay only refers to the
Fifth Amendment's "taking" prohibition.
6 W. SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO & JULIET, Act II, Scene II, 43-44.
' U.S. CONST. amend. V.
I Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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typically does not implicate this aspect of the Taking Clause.
VER controversies arise in the context of legislative enactments
which impact on the acquisition of property interests in federal
lands or in relation to federal and state statutes regulating certain
activities conducted on either public or private lands. The United
States Supreme Court has determined that the Property9 and
Commerce Clauses 10 of the United States Constitution expressly
confer the power on Congress to enact such federal legislation."
Obviously, such congressional enactments satisfy the public use
requirement. Similarly, state legislation containing VER provi-
sions finds validity in the state's police power to regulate for the
public health, welfare and safety. The Supreme Court has de-
termined that the scope of the public use requirement in the
Taking Clause is coextensive with the state's police power.12
The "just compensation" requirement of the Fifth Amend-
ment raises perplexing questions concerning when 3 and what
type of compensation 4 must be paid when a governmental action
amounts to an unconstitutional taking. However, resolution of
those problems does not affect the meaning of the phrase "valid
existing rights." Nor would an analysis of the just compensation
requirement establish whether the VER concept is coextensive
with the constitutional protections afforded property owners by
the Fifth Amendment.
For purposes of this essay, there are only two relevant steps
in the taking analysis. First, does the enactment or application
of the statute place a property interest of the complainant at
9 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 provides "The Congress shall have Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States ...."
'o U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides Congress shall have the power "[t]o
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States ... "
1 See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 321-329 (1981), in which the United
States Supreme Court sustained the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act from
allegations that it contravened the Commerce Clause.
,2 Hawaii Housing Authority, 467 U.S. at 240.
'3 See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 314-322 (1987) in which the Supreme Court held that where the government has
taken property by a land use regulation, the landowner may recover damages for the
time before it is finally determined that the regulation constitutes a taking of her or his
property.
" See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122
(1978), in which the Supreme Court refused to determine whether transferable develop-
ment rights afforded to the owners of the Grand Central terminal constituted "just
compensation" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
[VOL. 5:383
WHAT'S IN A NAME
risk? If the answer to that question is "no," the analysis stops.
The Fifth Amendment is not a limitation on all the actions
government may undertake. It is a check on only those govern-
mental actions which interfere with private property. 5
If the complainant does have a property interest placed at
risk because of the enactment of a particular statute, the inquiry
continues to the second step. The Fifth Amendment does not
require every governmental infringement on private property
rights to be either compensated or avoided. 6 The legislative
infringement on the complainant's at-risk property interest must
be analyzed to determine if it is the type of infringement which
amounts to a constitutionally impermissible interference known
as a "taking."
A. Defining Private Property
Private property is protected, but not created, by the United
States Constitution. Rather, private property is created and its
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
come from an independent sources.17 Both state" and federal
law' 9 are permissible sources for the creation and definition of
property rights. Laws which can create property rights are not
limited merely to formal, legislative enactments. Common law
20
is an equally valid source of property rights.
When the complainant's asserted interest falls into one of
the traditional categories of interests a person can have in real
property, it is relatively easy to determine whether the complain-
ant has a property interest at risk. For example, the complainant
may be the fee owner of land affected by the governmental
11 See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945). The
owners of a hydroelectric plant did not have a property interest in the power head it
lost when the government dammed a navigable stream.
16 Compare Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987)(Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act inter-
fered with, but did not take, the mineral owner's property rights) and Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 392 (Pennsylvania's Kohler Act interfered with and took
the mineral owner's property rights).
17 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Is E.g., Id.
,9 See Best v. Humbolt, 371 U.S. 334 (1963). The Supreme Court held that
unpatented mining claims on federal lands were property interests of a limited character.
20 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). A defacto tenure system created
a protectible property interest in continued employment in the complainant. See also,
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937).
1989-901
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action. 2' Other lesser interests in real estate such as leaseholds 2
and easements 23 are also readily recognized property interests for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment's protections. Similarly, in-
tangible property interests such as liens, 24 contract rights 2 and
trade secrets 26 are generally recognized as property interests pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment.
Because a property right is a bundle of legally protected
interests one can have in the object of property (rather than a
single, indivisible concept), each one of the sticks in the bundle
is also embraced by the term "property." Therefore, landowners
have legally recognized property interests in their right to enjoy
and use their land,27 to exclude others from it,2 to transfer it
intervivos by sale or gift, 29 and to pass it at death by devise or
descent.30
In some VER cases the court has been called upon to deter-
mine whether the complainant had a property interest at risk
because of the legislative enactment. For example, in American
Nuclear Corp. v. Andrus3' the complainant had applied for a
coal prospecting permit under the terms of the 1920 Mineral
Leasing Act. While the application was pending, Congress passed
the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975.32 Subject to
"valid existing rights," the 1975 Act terminated the issuance of
coal prospecting permits which gave the permittee preference
leasing rights. The applicant was thereafter denied a coal pros-
pecting permit with preference leasing rights.
If the applicant had a valid existing right to a coal pros-
pecting permit, the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 would have
2, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)(fee simple title under Ha-
waiian law to a lagoon).
1 United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946)(tenancy at will); and
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945)(tenancy for years).
23 Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)(railroad right of way).
22 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935)(real estate
lien).
" United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S.I, 19, n. 16 (1977).
- Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
22 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
28 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
29 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
10 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
11 434 F.Supp. 1035 (D.Wy. 1977).
32 Id. at 1036. The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-377, 90 Stat. 1083, amended the Mineral Leasing Act. See 30 U.S.C. § 181 note
(1988) (affected sections listed).
[VOL. 5:383
WHAT'S IN A NAME
been the source of that right. The court correctly analyzed the
nature of the complainant's interest in its application in light of
the provisions of the 1920 enactment.33 The 1920 Act granted
the Secretary of the Interior the discretion to accept or reject
permit applications.3 4 Consonant with previous judicial decisions
construing the nature of a permit application under the 1920
Act, the court held the mere filing of an application does not
create a property right in the applicant.35
Despite the opinion's VER rhetoric, the court was actually
engaged in nothing more than the first step of a traditional
taking analysis. Based on existing rules and understandings stem-
ming from the provisions of the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act (the
source of the property right or interest), the court merely deter-
mined that the nature and extent of the application did not
amount to a property interest or property right. The other step
in the taking analysis was not undertaken by the court because
it was not needed. Without a property right, the complainant
could not have suffered a taking.
Comparing the result in American Nuclear Corp.3 6 to the
United States Supreme Court decision in Stockley v. United
States,3 7 a case distinguished in the American Nuclear Corp.
opinion, is instructive. In Stockley, the existing rules governing
an entryperson's interest in receiving a land patent to federal
land open for settlement were established by the Homestead Act
(the source). The Act mandated the issuance of a land patent to
any person who had made entry if there was compliance with
the law's requirements.3" The Secretary of the Interior did not
have any discretion to refuse to issue the patent once the entry-
person satisfied the various statutory requirements. The Stockley
complainant did everything the Act required for the issuance of
a land patent. However, prior to the issuance of the land patent,
the President issued a withdrawal order. "Subject to valid exist-
ing rights," the presidential order withdrew certain public land,
including the land claimed by the complainant, from settlement.
Unlike the result in American Nuclear Corp., the complainant
11 American Nuclear Corp. v. Andrus, 434 F. Supp. at 1037.
14 Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 § 2(b).
" American Nuclear Corp. v. Andrus, 434 F.Supp. at 1037-1038.
36 Id.
" 260 U.S. 532 (1923).
31 Id. at 540.
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in Stockley was found to have a valid existing right to the
issuance of a land patent despite the withdrawal order.
Despite the characterizations of the Stockley complainant's
interest in receiving a patent as a valid existing right, the United
States Supreme Court reached the same result it would have if
it had employed a taking analysis. The Homestead Act deter-
mined the nature and extent of the complainant's interest in
receiving a land patent. Because the complainant had done all
that the source required for the mandatory issuance of a patent,
the complainant had acquired a property right to the issuance
of the patent prior to the withdrawal order. A refusal to grant
the patent would have amounted to a unconstitutional taking of
that property interest.
The source of the property interest (federal or state law) also
defines the nature or scope of the property right. That is, where
the creation of a substantive property right is inextricably inter-
twined with limitations on the right created, the owner of the
interest must take the bitter with the sweet.39 The property
interest is no greater than the limitations imposed upon it at its
creation.
The ability of the source of the property right to define the
parameters of the property interest can be illustrated by an
examination of a prospector's right of possession. A prospector's
right of possession while exploring a claim on federal land is a
classic property right. The right of possession is everywhere
recognized as one of the sticks in the bundle of rights a person
can have in an object of property. 4° Thus, prospectors have a
property right which protects them from encroachments by oth-
ers while they are exploring.
4'
However, the prospector's right of possession was created
with the essential limitation that it is inferior to the federal
government's power over federal land. A subsequent exercise of
that paramount power by the the federal government can not be
construed as as a violation of any valid existing right the pros-
pector has nor a taking of a property under the Fifth Amend-
ment. 42 From its inception, the extent of the prospector's right
was always limited by the government's power to divest it.
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-154 (1974).
See, e.g. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, (1946).
See Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 346-347 (1919).
41 See Wisenak, Inc. v. Andrus, 471 F.Supp. 1004, 1009 (D. Alaska 1979). It is
[VOL. 5:383
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Property owners also can acquire additional property inter-
ests in certain expectations they have concerning their property
interests. 43 A property owner's mere unilateral expectation or
belief concerning the use it can make of its property is not a
recognized property interest. 4 On the other hand, expectations
predicated on the actions of the government have been found to
rise to the level of a property right .4 Expectations accompanied
by significant financial investments have also been recognized as
property interests.
46
The Supreme Court decisions in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City47 and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto48 illustrate
the distinction between expectations which are not distinct prop-
erty interests and those which are protected property interests.
In Penn Central the owners of the Grand Central Terminal in
New York City claimed a constitutionally cognizable expectation
under the Fifth Amendment because of their belief, acquired
before the enactment of an historic preservation law, that they
could develop the air space above their terminal. The United
States Supreme Court found their claim to be "untenable." The
terminal owner's belief did not rest on any expectation created
by a act of the state itself. Moreover, the full use of the air
rights above the terminal had not played an integral role in the
terminal owner's decision to purchase the terminal.
In contrast, in Monsanto the company was found to have a
property interest in its expectation of continued control over the
use and dissemination of data it had submitted to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency as part of a license application pro-
cedure for new pesticides. The company submitted the
information to EPA pursuant to a federal statute which guar-
anteed to the company both nondisclosure and exclusive use of
the submitted material. Later, the statute was amended to permit
the EPA to disclose data submitted during the licensing process
and to allow other other companies to use the information. The
company's expectations of nondisclosure and exclusive use were
well established that a claim located on land which is not open to appropriation confers
no rights on the prospector.
41 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
- Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 124-125.
,1 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. at 179.
46 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
4 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
4s 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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created by an act of the government itself. The company's
expectations were backed by the significant investments it had
made in the development of the pesticide it wanted to license.
The company's belief was found to be a property right or
interest.
Some VER cases and definitions are merely determinations
that the complainant's particular expectation, or belief concern-
ing the use it can make of its property, rises to the level of a
property interest. The "modified all permits" definition of the
valid existing rights provision in the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act demonstrates the accuracy of this observation.
49
The test provides that if a landowner obtained all necessary
mining permits or made a good faith effort to obtain all neces-
sary mining permits prior to August 3, 1977 (the effective date
of SMCRA), the owner is exempted from Section 522(c) per se
prohibitions of coal mining on certain land. Such an applicant
would have made a sizeable financial investment in its now
substantial expectation of mining under the rules which were in
effect at the time of the permit application. In other words, the
applicant has gone "so far" under the rules that existed at the
time of its application for a permit, a property right in its
expectation that it can mine under those rules has arisen. Thus,
the "modified all permits" definition of VER merely delineates
one instance when a taking analysis would find an owner's belief
concerning the possible use it can make of the property has
become a property interest.
B. Identifying Interferences With Property Which Amount to
a Taking
The Fifth Amendment does not require every governmental
infringement on private property rights to be either compensated
or avoided. Therefore, determining that a complainant has a
property interest at risk because of a subsequent legislative en-
actment does not end the inquiry. The next question is whether
the statute can be applied to the complainant's property interest
consistent with the commands of the Fifth Amendment. If a
person has a property interest with which a later statutory en-
actment interferes, the interference itself must be analyzed to
49 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing history of VER rulemaking).
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determine if it is an infringement of the type and character
which is unconstitutional.
There is no set formula for gauging which governmental
interferences with property amount to takings and which do
not.50 However, the United States Supreme Court has identified
three factors which are significant in such a determination: (1)
the character of the governmental action; (2) its economic im-
pact; and (3) its interference with the reasonable investment-
backed expectations of the property owner. 5 All three factors
need not be present for an impermissible interference to occur.
The starting point in analyzing the constitutionality of inter-
ferences with property interests is the character of the govern-
mental action. When the governmental action is a direct, physical
invasion of the complainant's property, the interference is un-
constitutional even though the occupation has only a minimal
economic impact on the owner's property.5 2 Similarly, an im-
permissible interference occurs when the government appropri-
ates a person's property for the government's own use. 3 At the
other end of the spectrum from physical invasion and taking for
the government's own use, is governmental action to abate or
prevent a nuisance. When the government acts to restrain uses
of property that are tantamount to a public nuisance, those
actions are rarely found to constitute a taking.1
4
When the governmental act is not a physical invasion or an
appropriation of the complainant's property and it is not a
restraint on property uses tantamount to a nuisance, the analysis
becomes more complicated. The character of the governmental
act remains a factor, but the economic impact of the act enters
into the analysis.
If the property owner possesses the full bundle of rights an
owner can have in the property, a governmental act destroying
certain strands in the bundle does not constitute a taking. 5 For
example, the Eagle Protection Act prohibited a person from
selling eagle feathers even if the feathers had been legally ac-
quired before the Act was adopted. The United States Supreme
10 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 124.
1, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. at 175.
12 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
11 Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163-164 (1980).
14 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 491.
11 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. at 65-66.
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Court sustained the statute even though it deprived the feather
owners of one of the strands in their bundle of property rights
(the right to transfer intervivos by sale or gift). Other strands
remained in the bundle - the right to exclude, the right to possess,
the right of inheritance. Thus, the owners had not suffered an
impermissible interference with their property rights because they
had not been deprived of all the strands in their bundle of rights.
Sometimes, the governmental act takes the form of regulating
landowners' uses of their land. The right of use is one of the
traditional sticks in a property owner's bundle of property rights.
However, an impermissible interference occurs only if the land
use regulation denies landowners "all" economically viable use
of their land.56 This explains why the "modified all permits"
definition of the valid existing rights provision in SMCRA is
inadequate. The definition does not embrace the constitutional
requirement that SMCRA's per se prohibitions on mining on
certain land cannot be applied to mineral owner who, on the
date SMCRA became effective, only owned a mineral interest in
land on which SMCRA imposed the per se mining prohibitions.
If the per se mining prohibitions were applied to such mineral
estate owners, they would suffer a total destruction of all eco-
nomically viable use of their mineral estate. That would be an
unconstitutional interference with the mineral owner's property.
In some circumstances, governmental regulations which do
not totally destroy landowners' rights to use their property may
nonetheless be an impermissible interference with property rights.
The Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence recognizes that a
governmental act may be constitutionally impermissible because
it materially interferes with landowners' reasonable, investment-
backed expectations concerning the use they can make of their
property.5 7 When property owners have gone "far enough" to
acquire reasonable, investment-backed expectations concerning
the use they can make of their property, imposition of the new
regulations on them would be going "too far" for purposes of
the protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment.
Much VER litigation is best understood as judicial determi-
nations of whether the statute's interference with a recognized
property right amounts to a constitutionally impermissible in-
fringement on that property interest. For example, in Utah v.
16 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
" Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 499.
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Andrus"8 the court expressly recognized that the VER protection
afforded mineral owners under the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA) 9 required it to evaluate the scope
of the interference under the taking clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. 60 The complainant in Utah wanted to build an access road
across the federal land which totally surrounded its property.
After the complainant had acquired its land from the federal
government, but prior to its attempt to build an access road,
the surrounding federal land was designated a Wilderness Study
Area. Such a designation precluded the construction of the com-
plainant's contemplated access road unless the valid existing right
provisions of the Act applied to it.
Despite the fact that the FLPMA contained a VER provi-
sion, 61 the Utah court eschewed the use of VER rhetoric. Instead,
the court determined that the Bureau of Land Management had
to permit the state and its lessee a right of access (an easement)
to the state's trust lands even though the easement would trans-
verse a Wilderness Study Area. The court reached its decision
because it expressly found that a denial of all access to the land
would be an unconstitutional infringement on the landowner's
property rights - a taking. Denial of access would deprive the
landowner of all use of its property. The Utah court did rec-
ognize that the state's right of access across federal land could
be regulated by the federal government under the FLPMA stan-
dards applicable to Wilderness Study Areas. However, the court
appropriately warned that under the guise of so regulating the
easement, access could not be prohibited, nor could the regula-
tion be so restrictive as to deprive the state of all economical
use of its property.
CONCLUSION
The hypothetical distinction between a VER and a Taking
analysis proves to be a distinction without a difference when the
actual results of VER litigation are examined. None of the
symposium participants have located a judicial or quasi-judicial
VER decision which actually protects an interest which would
" 486 F.Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979).
FLPMA § 701(h), 43 U.S.C. 1701 note (1982).
60 Utah v. Andrus, 468 F.Supp. at 1010-11.
61 Note 59, supra.
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not have been recognized as property under a Fifth Amendment
analysis. Similarly, none of the participants have identified a
VER decision which prevented an interference with property
which would not have amounted to an impermissible interference
(taking) under the Fifth Amendment.
There are a number of reasons why it is both cogent and
wise to treat the protections afforded claimants of a valid exist-
ing right under a congressional enactment as coterminus with,
not in addition to, the protections afforded those claiming the
protections of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. Concepts of fairness dictate such a result. If VER
protection is synonymous with the dictates of the Taking Clause,
all owners of the same type of property interest (e.g., fee,
easement, use rights, or reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tion) are protected in the same manner and to the same extent
from governmental activities which impact on their property
rights.
If the VER concept is treated as coextensive with the protec-
tions afford by the Fifth Amendment, determinations about the
validity of the application of a particular statute to the particular
claimant will be made with reference to a defined body of law.
It is true that the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence can be
problematic. This is especially true when the courts are called
upon to deal with the protections to be afforded novel property
claims or when the courts must determine whether a new type
of governmental activity has exceeded the constitutionally per-
missible degree of interference with existing property rights.
However, VER litigation does not typically implicate either
of these considerations. The property interests asserted by a VER
claimant are often of the classic form (fees, leases, easements)
and the governmental act of which the petitioner complains is
generally not very novel. More often than not, the genesis of
VER litigation is a federal or state statute imposing new regu-
lations on the uses of property. Takings jurisprudence provides
a relatively clear conceptual framework for resolving claims which
involve the constitutional permissibility of land use regulations
which interfere with property rights.
Treating the concept of "valid existing rights" as cotermi-
nous with the taking prohibition of the Fifth Amendment also
avoids creating a second level of litigation. If VER is something
other than, and not as extensive as, the constitutional taking
prohibition, a determination that a complainant does not have
[VOL. 5:383
WHAT'S IN A NAmE
a VER does not resolve the possible constitutional dimension of
the dispute. A determination whether the complained of govern-
mental act violates the property owners' rights to be secure
against uncompensated takings of their property would still be
necessary. Conversely, before a VER provision in a statute could
be understood to offer more protection than that of the Taking
Clause, the parameters of the particular VER would have to be
precisely defined for all the situations in which it might arise.
Then, this finely crafted definition would have to be subject to
litigation to determine that it offers more protection in all the
situations to which it applies than the Fifth Amendment. Real-
istically, such a feat of drafting is unlikely to occur and such a
judicial determination is unlikely to be rendered. Thus, the po-
tential claim that the statutory VER provision offers protections
less broad than the constitutional protections afforded property
owners under the Fifth Amendment cannot be eliminated.
Finally, treating a VER provision as something different
from the Fifth Amendment's protection of private property raises
questions about remedies. It is clear that if a regulatory scheme
effects a taking of a person's property, the property owner is
entitled to relief from the regulation and just compensation for
the time period of the regulatory taking. It is not clear, however,
whether the remedies for an impermissible denial of a VER are
the same as those constitutionally required remedies if a VER is
not coterminous with the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against
the taking of private property for public use without just com-
pensation.
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